European Monetary System
negative aspects of the external economic environment.
The statistical requirements of the ESCB
Speech delivered by Eugenio Domingo Solans,
Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank
on the occasion of a visit to the Banque Centrale du Luxembourg
Luxembourg, 25 March 1999
The booklet introducing statistical requirements for Stage Three,
which the EMI published in July 1996, began with the bold statement:
"Nothing is more important for the conduct of monetary policy than good
statistics." These challenging words show the importance which the EMI
attached to this area of preparations for Monetary Union, and I must say
this has been fully justified by our experience in the first few weeks of
the life of the euro.
The statement of requirements
But let me start back in 1996. Because of the time it takes to
implement statistical changes in reporting institutions and central banks,
a statement of prospective statistical requirements could be delayed no
longer. But that statement had to be made with very imperfect knowledge.
Nobody knew at that stage (for example) what definitions of monetary
aggregates would be chosen for the single currency area, or what their role
would be. Given the differences in financial structures in our countries,
it was not clear how to identify the financial institutions from whose
liabilities the money stock would be compiled. It was decided to define
them in functional terms, and in such a way that money-market funds as well
as banks of the traditional type would be included. It was not clear at
that stage whether minimum reserves would be applied, and, if they were,
what form they would take - although it had been decided that the banking
statistics data would provide the basis for any such system. Implementation
had to start quickly for the statistics to be ready in time for a Monetary
Union starting in 1999, but no one knew which Member States would adopt the
single currency - though it was clear that the distinction between business
inside and outside the euro area, would be of critical importance for
monetary and balance of payments statistics, and would have to be planned
for in statistical systems.
In mentioning monetary and balance of payments statistics, I do not
want to suggest that the statistical requirements set out in 1996 were
confined to these areas. On the contrary, they covered a wide range of
financial and economic data, including financial accounts, prices and costs
- relating directly to the ESCB's main responsibility under the Treaty,
namely to maintain price stability - government finance data, national
accounts, labour market statistics, production and trade data and other
conjunctural statistics, and more besides. These areas are, or course,
under Eurostat's responsibility.
The focus on the euro area as a whole
In formulating and implementing statistical requirements, it was
important to realise that the ESCB's attention would have to focus on the
euro area as a whole. Monetary policy cannot discriminate among different
areas of the Monetary Union - although in practice it may have different
effects because of different national economic and financial structures.
Focus on the area as a whole has important implications. The data must be
sufficiently comparable for sensible aggregation; they must also be
available to a comparable timeliness and to the same frequency. In some
cases (monetary and balance of payments statistics) they had to be
available in a form permitting appropriate consolidation. In short, with a
few exceptions, it was realised that adding together existing national data
would not be adequate. Important initiatives were already under way, such
as the adoption of a new European System of Accounts [ESA95] and the
implementation at national level of a new IMF Balance of Payments Manual.
However, wide-ranging statistical preparations would be necessary for the
ECB to have the sort of statistical information that the national central
banks have traditionally used in conducting monetary policy.
How far the provision meets the current need
I arrived at the ECB about 2 years after these requirements had been
released and 7 months before the start of Monetary Union. I must confess
that I doubted many times in those early weeks whether statistics could be
ready in time to sustain monetary policy decisions. There were anxious
moments too in the late stages of finalising the monetary policy strategy:
would the requirements set out in 1996 correspond to the need perceived in
autumn 1998?
I am now sure that the decisions made in 1996 were correct. In
practice, one choice in autumn 1998 was almost automatic: thanks to the
work of Eurostat and the national statistical offices in the context of the
convergence criteria (with active involvement of the EMI), there was no
plausible rival to the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the
purpose of defining price stability. I am aware that national consumer
price indices are sometimes criticised for overstating inflation, because
they take insufficient account of quality improvements and use outdated
weights. While further development of the HICP is to come, and at present
there is no satisfactory treatment of expenditure on housing, I believe
that every effort has been made to apply the lessons from experience with
national consumer price measures. The other choices for statistical
elements in the strategy were less obvious. In fact the banking statistics
reporting structure announced in 1996 proved able to provide the monetary
aggregates and the counterpart analysis required, and - with a little fine-
tuning - to meet the needs of a statistical basis for reserve requirements,
details of which were also finalised in the autumn. We were thus able to
begin publishing monetary statistics only a few days after the final
decisions were taken (at the Council meeting on 1 December), and were able
to publish with some estimation last month back data on the three monetary
aggregates monthly to 1980, and a note urging caution on users of the
earlier data.
However, the monetary strategy avoids putting too much weight on one
area or type of information. This is only partly for statistical reasons.
The formation of the euro area is a substantial structural change, which
may in time affect monetary and financial relationships. So the ECB also
examines a range of economic data for the light they shed on the assessment
of the economic situation and, in particular, prospects for inflation. The
editorial and economic developments sections of the Monetary Bulletin show
the way the ECB draws on this information; the statistical information
itself is set out in tables in the statistical section. Thus, in addition
to money and credit and the HICP, the editorial typically touches on GDP,
industrial output, capacity utilisation, orders, the labour market,
business and consumer confidence, costs and prices other than the HICP,
earnings and wage settlements, fiscal positions - naturally placing the
emphasis on what are judged to be the most important developments at the
time. All these areas were covered by the statement of requirements made in
1996.
I do not need to say that, at present, an accurate assessment of the
economic situation in the euro area is of vital importance. The editorial
section of the March Bulletin concludes that the overall outlook for price
stability remains favourable, with no major risk that HICP inflation will
exceed 2% in the near future, but there is nevertheless a balance of
conflicting influences. To reach this judgement, the Bulletin assesses the
latest GDP data (slower growth in the provisional Eurostat figures for GDP
in the 4th quarter of 1998; declining manufacturing output), the labour
market (unemployment falling slightly; some signs of rising pay
settlements), and confidence indicated by opinion surveys (business
confidence weak; the consumer mood rather optimistic). The economic
developments section supports the overall conclusion, and analyses in more
detail price and cost developments and of output, demand and the labour
market. It concludes with analysis of the fiscal position in the euro area
in 1998, and a preview based on fiscal plans for 1999. I am drawing your
attention to this to show the variety of material supporting the ECB's
assessment of the economic and financial position and prospects. Although
we pay particular attention to certain items - the monetary statistics,
with an emphasis this time on influences contributing to recent faster
growth, and to the rather rapid growth of credit, and the HICP - we draw on
a wide range of information in a continuous monitoring exercise. The
establishment of an institution responsible for monetary policy in the euro
area has caused a fundamental change in the use of macroeconomic statistics
at European level, very much as anticipated by the Implementation Package
nearly 3 years ago.
Priorities for further improvement of statistics
I would like to take this opportunity to thank Eurostat for their
efforts to improve the quality and comparability of economic statistics
relating to the euro area, and to deliver them to the ECB on a timely
manner. They have given this high priority and much progress has been made
in the last year or so. Further improvement will come with the introduction
of the new European System of Accounts [ESA95] starting next month
(although we must expect some temporary confusion following the
introduction of a new system). Experience suggests that substantial
statistical changes initially bring classification problems. Although, of
course, provision has been made for back data to be available on the
closest possible approximation to the new basis, we must also expect some
discontinuity in important series. Implementation of last year's short-term
Statistics Regulation will bring improvements across a wide range of
conjunctural statistics not covered by ESA95. There are also initiatives to
improve labour market statistics. With Eurostat, who are responsible for
all these areas of statistics at European level, we do our best in the ECB
to promote better data. Perhaps I should underline our support here for the
priorities established last year by a working group of the Monetary
Committee (the current Economic and Financial Committee), in which Yves
Franchet and two of my ECB colleagues participated (Peter Bull and Gert Jan
Hogeweg): in addition to quarterly GDP and short-term conjunctural
statistics, these were government finance statistics, data relating to the
labour market (including labour costs), and the balance of payments. At
present the lack of comparable national statistics during the course of the
year makes it difficult to monitor the fiscal stance in the area as a
whole, and so to assess the balance of fiscal and monetary policy. Better
labour market statistics are important, not only for the ECB's assessment
of possible inflationary pressure, but also to improve understanding of the
structure of labour markets in our countries, and the rigidities which
impede the achievement of fuller employment. Balance of payments statistics
- a shared responsibility of the ECB and Eurostat at European level -
require a new approach in compiling data for the euro area as a whole. We
intend to publish the first monthly data for the euro area following the
new methodology next month, and to begin joint publication of a quarterly
euro-area balance of payments with Eurostat in the summer. But there are
deeper questions about future needs for balance of payments statistics in
the new circumstances which are currently being addressed. Principally, the
question arises of the usefulness for policy purposes of national balance
of payments statistics for Member States participating in Monetary Union.
There is no question, of course, that certain data in this area are needed
within the ESA95 framework of national and financial accounts.
The organisational, legal and technical infrastructure
I have talked mainly about statistical requirements and their
provision, but this is only part of the story. The Treaty (specifically in
Article 5 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB) clearly envisaged that
the ECB would perform statistical functions, assisted by and in co-
operation with national central banks, other national authorities, the
Commission (meaning in this context in particular Eurostat), and
international organisations. A large part of the preparatory work carried
out by the EMI consisted of sorting out who would do what, avoiding so far
as possible duplication, wasted effort and conflicting data, and keeping
the whole development consistent with international statistical
conventions. Much of this had to be framed in legal instruments, which
would complete the statutory framework provided by the Treaty and the
ESCB/ECB Statute. Although work on an EU Council Regulation concerning ECB
statistics began as early as 1996, the Regulation could not be finalised
until last autumn and the ECB could not adopt legal instruments on
statistics in advance of that event - much work in this area therefore had
to be done at the last minute.
Information Technology is another of my responsibilities at the ECB.
I am glad to say that essential elements of our data transfer and
statistical processing systems were in place when I arrived, or brought
into operation soon afterwards. But here, too, there is room for further
improvement - the EMI and the ECB in these early months have had so much to
do in relation to the resources available that, broadly speaking, only the
essentials have been provided so far.
Conclusion
"Nothing is more important for monetary policy than good statistics."
The formation of Monetary Union has shifted the focus of interest on to
data covering the euro area as a whole. This has required substantial
changes to statistics, which need time to settle down and are some way
short of completion. At the same time, the adoption of the single currency
is itself a massive structural change. This will surely affect economic and
financial relationships and make any data harder to interpret, although
these deeper effects may occur over a period and take some time to become
apparent. What is clear, however, is that the ECB must take policy
decisions and explain them publicly in terms of the data available relating
to its policy responsibility. What we continue to strive to do, through our
own efforts and with the help of Eurostat, is to improve the quality of the
data underlying policy decisions, which are so important in gaining public
understanding and acceptance for them.
***
The tasks and limitations of monetary policy
Speech delivered by Christian Noyer
Vice-President of the European Central Bank,
at the Volkswirtschaftliche Tagung of the Oesterreichische
Nationalbank,
on 10 June 1999 in Vienna
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a pleasure for me to be here in Vienna today and I should like
to start by thanking the conference organisers for giving me the
opportunity to elaborate on the tasks and limitations of monetary policy.
This topic is extremely important. Looking back over the history of
economic thought, it is clear that the perception of what monetary policy
can do and what it cannot or should not do has changed. This has clearly
shaped the role of monetary policy in economic policy. In the 1960s
economic theories suggested a long-run trade-off between inflation and
output. These theories provided the intellectual basis for policy-makers to
pursue monetary policies biased towards higher inflation. The high
inflation experience of the 1970s together with new theoretical findings,
especially on the role of expectations, led policy-makers to move towards
lowering and stabilising inflation.
Theoretical considerations as well as empirical evidence over several
decades suggest that high rates of inflation are clearly unhelpful - indeed
detrimental - to growth and employment in the long term. A large number of
economic arguments point to the benefits of price stability for economic
growth and employment prospects. Stable prices eliminate economic costs
such as those arising from unnecessary uncertainty about the outcome of
investment decisions, the distortionary effects on the tax system, rising
risk premia in long-term interest rates and the reduced allocative
effectiveness of the price and market systems. To quote Alan Greenspan,
chairman of the United States Federal Reserve, "Price stability is achieved
when the public no longer takes account of actual or prospective inflation
in its decision-making." Monetary policy must take into account the fact
that the horizon for decisions by economic agents is rather long-term in
nature. By guaranteeing price stability, monetary policy supports the
efficient functioning of the price mechanism, which is conducive to the
allocation of scarce resources. Price stability is a means of promoting
sustainable economic growth and employment creation and of improving
productivity levels and living standards.
Against this background, the predominant view has emerged that the
best and most lasting contribution that monetary policy can make to long-
term economic welfare in the broader sense is that of safeguarding price
stability. Central banks throughout the world have been moving towards
adopting long-term price stability as their primary goal.
In order to achieve this goal most successfully, independence from
political interference and a clear legal mandate for price stability are of
the utmost importance. A lack of central bank independence and an ambiguous
mandate can easily force central banks to focus on the short term and,
thus, fail to adopt the forward-looking, medium-term orientation that is
crucial for a successful monetary strategy.
All these issues were taken into consideration by policy-makers when
drafting the Treaty establishing the European Community and designing the
blueprint for the European Central Bank. Both central bank independence and
an unequivocal commitment to price stability are therefore tenets of the
monetary policy framework enshrined in the Treaty. There can be no doubt
that the European Central Bank (ECB) is determined and well-equipped to
tackle its main task, namely, that of maintaining price stability in the
euro area over the medium term. It will thereby make a significant
contribution to the achievement of other Community objectives such as high
employment and sustainable non-inflationary growth. In this connection, the
pursuit of sound macroeconomic policies by the EU Member States would
considerably facilitate the task of the ECB. The room for manoeuvre in
monetary policy and the degree of success in terms of maintaining price
stability are crucially dependent on the support of sound fiscal policies
and responsible wage settlements in the euro area.
The Treaty establishing the European Community states that the
primary objective of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is to
maintain price stability. Without prejudice to this objective, the ESCB
shall support the general economic policies in the European Community. It
shall operate in a manner that is consistent with the establishment of free
and competitive markets. The Treaty states explicitly how the ESCB shall
set its priorities. Price stability is the first goal of the monetary
policy of the Eurosystem, and a contribution to the achievement of the
other objectives of the European Community can only be made if this primary
objective is not compromised. However, there is ultimately no
incompatibility between maintaining price stability and pursuing these
other objectives. By maintaining price stability, the ECB will also
contribute to the achievement of other Community objectives.
Of course, the ECB is concerned about the intolerably high level of
unemployment in Europe, but we should realise that the role of monetary
policy in reducing unemployment in Europe can only be very limited. Many
empirical studies show that the high unemployment rate is mostly the
consequence of structural rigidities within the European labour and product
markets. The European unemployment rate has, indeed, been high and stable
over the business cycles in the past decade. Only structural reforms,
preferably of a comprehensive nature, can therefore tackle the underlying
impediments to employment growth.
The monetary policy of the Eurosystem is geared towards the euro area
as a whole and, thus, cannot take into account purely national and regional
developments. The cyclical positions of participating countries have not
yet completely converged, although, with the single currency in place, some
national differences may disappear over time. This requires national
policies and labour and goods markets to be increasingly flexible in order
to be able to respond effectively to economic shocks. Well-functioning
labour and product markets are therefore needed to allow adjustments to
wages and prices to be made if local economic conditions change.
Budgetary policies play a major role in conditioning monetary policy.
National fiscal authorities have to demonstrate their commitment to the
maintenance of price stability in the euro area over the medium term. In
this context, the Stability and Growth Pact is a crucial element. Its aim
is to encourage the pursuit of disciplined and sustainable fiscal policies
by the participating EU Member States and the prospective members. Sound
public finances, with lower public debt and tax burdens, contribute to a
lowering of long-term interest rates, reduce uncertainty and increase
private capital formation. They not only facilitate the task of monetary
policy with regard to the maintenance of price stability, but also
strengthen the conditions for sustainable growth conducive to employment
creation. Conversely, unsound fiscal policies tend to increase inflation
expectations and force monetary policy to keep short-term rates higher than
would otherwise be necessary.
The single monetary policy has to be conducted independently of the
short-term political considerations of national governments. In this
context, the ECB cannot commit itself to move its interest rates in a
certain way in response to specific actions or plans of other policy-
makers. Monetary policy has to take into account the overall economic
situation to assess the risks to price stability. Direct ex ante co-
ordination with fiscal authorities might endanger meeting the primary
objective and would set the wrong incentives for the conduct of sound
macroeconomic policies. This does not, of course, exclude a constructive
dialogue between the Eurosystem and government authorities which clearly
respects the independence of the ECB.
When dealing with one of the major world currencies and with the
currency of one of the two main world economies, it is inconceivable that
price stability might be maintained by setting an exchange rate target as
an intermediate objective. However, external developments including the
exchange rate are taken into account in accordance with our strategy, as
they may have an impact on domestic economic developments and thereby on
price stability. Referring to recent exchange rate developments in this
context, it is appropriate for me to quote the President of the ECB, Dr. W.
F. Duisenberg, who recently said that "the euro is a currency firmly based
on internal price stability, and therefore has a clear potential for a
stronger external value".
The absence of exchange rate targets for the euro vis-а-vis other
major currencies should not be misunderstood. For smaller, very open
economies, fixed exchange rates may be a very reasonable choice. The
Austrian example is one of the most prominent in this respect. By pegging
the Austrian schilling to the Deutsche mark for over twenty years, it
proved possible to import credibility and price stability. The increasingly
close pegging of the Austrian currency to the currency of its main trading
partner was, among other features of the Austrian policy mix, the driving
force behind the economic convergence process in the run-up to Stage Three
of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The credibility of the Austrian
exchange rate target was also underpinned by an income policy aiming at
relatively high real wage flexibility and a fiscal policy geared towards
consolidation. All in all, the Austrian model, which set out to guarantee
stability in nominal and real terms, has turned out to be very successful.
The example given by past Austrian experience is, I believe, very
valuable. It shows that the achievement of sustainable convergence with the
euro area can be assisted by means of an exchange rate target. The new
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Union, ERM II, may play a similar
role for those current and prospective EU Member States which have not yet
joined Stage Three of EMU.
The achievement of price stability is also of high importance for the
stability of the financial system. The financial system of the euro area
showed a high degree of stability during last year's period of financial
turbulence as well as during the rather dramatic structural shift connected
to the changeover to the euro. At the ECB, we play our part in the
evolution of the euro area financial system by providing it with stable
monetary conditions. By creating an environment of price stability, we
allow private sector agents to focus their attention on the questions that
are most relevant to their activities and to take advantage of benefits of
this stable environment, such as the lengthening of their planning
horizons. There is a lot of empirical evidence that safeguarding price
stability is the optimal contribution that a central bank can make to the
maintenance of financial stability and that those two goals are actually
complementary.
I should like to conclude by saying that the main contribution of the
single monetary policy to the welfare of the people in the euro area will
be the maintenance of price stability in the medium term. The ECB is
determined to tackle this task and is well-equipped to do so. Our
conviction is that the economic performance of the euro area will benefit
significantly from price stability. This will ultimately facilitate the
achievement of those objectives, which underlie the general economic
policies of the European Community and the individual governments at the
national level. However, the economic problems in the euro area cannot be
tackled by monetary policy alone. We have to be realistic about the goals
which can be achieved by monetary policy. Neglecting the limitations of
monetary policy and promising too much could, in the long term, be
detrimental to the establishment of a stability culture in Europe, and
could also lead to delays in implementing the economic reforms that are
crucial to achieving high growth and employment.
***
European Central Bank
Press Division
Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main
Tel.: 0049 69 1344 7455, Fax: 0049 69 1344 7404
Internet: http://www.ecb.int
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