European Monetary System
a moderation in the pace of growth and further developments in these
indicators will continue to be monitored closely. Area-wide growth should,
however, be supported by a number of domestic factors. One factor
supporting continued growth, particularly in private consumption, is the
gradual improvement in labour market conditions. Moreover, the lowest short-
term interest rates in the euro area currently stand at 3.3%, and several
countries have cut interest rates towards this level recently as part of
the process towards interest rate convergence. The process of convergence
towards this level has been gradual, but should imply a reduction in the
average short-term interest rate in the euro area of about 0.5 percentage
point since July. Long-term rates also stand at low levels. And, there has
been a marked degree of exchange rate stability among countries
participating in the euro. This is undoubtedly a welcome development from
the standpoint of encouraging trade and investment. Thus, our assessment is
similar to that of other international organisations, that - unless the
international environment deteriorates further, which is not currently
expected - growth will be somewhat weaker in 1999. Growth should, however,
remain high enough to support continued employment creation and, assuming a
recovery in the international environment, there should be a pick-up in
growth in the year 2000. At the meetings in December the ECB Governing
Council will again assess the outlook for economic and price developments.
Although the economic outlook may be less favourable than expected -
let us say - half a year ago, I believe that the conditions for a
successful launch of the euro are in place. You can be sure that the ESCB
will do its utmost to make the euro a stable currency.
The euro: pushing the boundaries
Presentation by Ms Sirkka Hдmдlдinen,
Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank,
at the symposium arranged by the European Private Equity and
Venture Capital Association
on 11 June 1999 in Prague
It is a great honour for me to be invited here today to this
symposium arranged by the European Private Equity and Venture Capital
Association to speak about the new European currency - the euro. Indeed,
the theme of this symposium - "Pushing the boundaries" - is very
appropriate when speaking about the euro. To my mind, the establishment of
Economic and Monetary Union can be characterised as pushing the boundaries
in several ways, such as:
* pushing the boundaries in the process of European
integration;
* pushing the boundaries of stability-oriented policies in
Europe; and
* pushing the boundaries of market integration in Europe.
In today's presentation, I shall give an overview of these three
aspects of Economic and Monetary Union. Thereafter, I shall discuss more
thoroughly the implications of the single currency for the development of
the European financial markets, focusing on the capital markets. Finally, I
shall reflect briefly on the importance of equity prices, and other asset
prices, in the formulation of monetary policy.
1. Pushing the boundaries of the process of European integration
I shall start with a few comments on the role of the euro in the
overall European integration process: I think there is little doubt that in
future books on European history the start of the third stage of European
Economic and Monetary Union on 1 January 1999 will be marked as a
significant and unique event in the long process of European integration.
On that day, the national currencies of 11 EU countries became
denominations of the euro. At the same time, the "Eurosystem" (which is
composed of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 11 national central
banks (NCBs) of the participating Member States) assumed responsibility for
the monetary policy of the euro area.
In order to put this event into a historical context, I should like
to note that the establishment of an Economic and Monetary Union in Europe
was, in fact, originally motivated more by general political arguments than
by economic arguments. In the current debate, these overall political
arguments have almost disappeared. Instead, the media and economic analysts
are increasingly focusing their assessment of the new currency on the
recent short-term economic and financial developments in the euro area.
The process of European integration started shortly after the end of
the Second World War and gained momentum in the 1950s. At the time, the
striving for integration was mainly driven by the aim of eliminating the
risk that wars and crises would once more plague the continent. Through the
establishment of common institutions, political conflicts could be avoided
or at least resolved through discussion and compromise.
The idea of establishing a monetary union and a common monetary
policy was raised at an early stage of this process. It was argued that the
full economic effects from integration in Europe could only be gained if
the transaction costs of exchanging different currencies were eliminated.
Other benefits of a monetary union in Europe were emphasised less in the
early stages of the discussion, partly due to the fact that at that time
the Bretton Woods system was already providing a high degree of exchange
rate stability.
The first concrete proposal for an economic and monetary union in
Europe was presented in 1970 in the so-called Werner Report, named after
the then Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Pierre Werner. However, this
proposal was never implemented. In the aftermath of the break-up of the
Bretton Woods system and the shock of the first oil crisis in 1973, the
European economies entered a period of stagnation with high inflation,
persisting unemployment and instability in exchange rates and interest
rates. The European countries applied very different policy responses to
the unfavourable economic developments, and policy co-ordination
deteriorated. In this environment, it was not realistic to establish a
monetary union.
The experience of this volatile period showed that large exchange
rate fluctuations between the European currencies led to a disruption of
trade flows and an unfavourable investment climate, thereby hampering the
aims of achieving growth, employment, economic stability and enhanced
integration. Therefore, the benefits of eliminating intra-EU exchange rate
volatility became an increasingly powerful argument when the issue of
establishing an economic and monetary union was revisited in the so-called
Delors Report in 1989.
The Delors Report contained a detailed plan for the establishment of
Economic and Monetary Union and eventually became the basis for the
drafting of the Maastricht Treaty. This time, the time schedule for
establishing the Economic and Monetary Union took into account the need to
first achieve a high degree of nominal convergence for the participating
countries.
The fact that the plan for the introduction of the single currency
was then pursued and implemented in such a determined and consistent manner
implied, in itself, a boost for the overall process of integration. The
momentum of the process of integration is no longer crucially dependent on
political decisions. By contrast, the integration of the European economies
has become an irreversible and self-sustained process, which is proceeding
automatically in all areas of political, economic, social and cultural
life. The euro can thus be seen as a catalyst for further co-ordination and
integration in other policy areas. This is one way in which the
introduction of the euro has definitely helped to push the boundaries in
the process of European integration.
Another way to push the boundaries in the European integration
process relates to the geographical extent of the euro area and the
European Union. Here, I sincerely hope that the four EU countries which
have not yet adopted the euro will soon be able to join the Monetary Union.
At the same time, I hope the process to enlarge the European Union with the
applicant countries will progress successfully. An enlargement of the euro
area and of the European Union would further strengthen the role of Europe
in a global perspective and should be for the benefit of all participating
countries. However, it is clear that countries aiming to join the Economic
Monetary Union would have to fulfil the same degree of nominal convergence
as was required from the participating countries when the Economic and
Monetary Union was established. This is essential in order to avoid
tensions to emerge in the euro area, which could eventually compromise
macro-economic stability.
2. Pushing the boundaries of stability-oriented economic policies
Economic and Monetary Union in Europe also provides an opportunity to
push the boundaries in areas of economic policy. The convergence process
prior to the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union was helpful in
order to achieve a broad consensus among policy makers on the virtues of
stability-oriented policies, i.e. policies directed towards price
stability, fiscal discipline and structural reform geared at promoting
growth and employment. The convergence process also helped policy makers to
focus their efforts on the formulation of stability-oriented economic
policies in the participating countries and it also facilitated the
acceptance of these policies among the general public.
In the new environment of Economic and Monetary Union, monetary
policy can no longer be applied as a means of accommodating economic
developments in an individual Member State. Such nation-specific
developments would have to be countered by fiscal and structural policies,
while the best way in which the single monetary policy can contribute to
improved conditions for growth and employment is by ensuring price
stability in the euro area as a whole. In this respect, the formulation of
the Maastricht Treaty is instrumental, since it guarantees the Eurosystem's
firm commitment to price stability; it clearly specifies that price
stability is the primary objective of the single monetary policy.
The Eurosystem has put a lot of effort into establishing a monetary
policy framework that will ensure that it can fulfil its primary objective
of price stability as efficiently as possible. There are several aspects to
this framework.
First, the Eurosystem has adopted a quantitative definition of the
primary objective - the Governing Council of the ECB has defined price
stability as a year-on-year increase of the Harmonised Index of Consumer
Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%. This is a medium-term
objective. In the short run, many factors beyond the scope of monetary
policy also affect price movements.
Second, the Eurosystem has made public the strategy to be used for
the implementation of the single monetary policy. This strategy is based on
two key elements, whereby money has been assigned a prominent role, as
signalled by the announcement of a Z- -#"+ !-+
1999\SEATSCASE.DOCh[?]€б@[?]Rreference rate of 4Ѕ% for the 12-month growth
of the euro area monetary aggregate M3. The other element consists of a
broadly based assessment of the outlook for price developments and the
risks to price stability in the euro area on the basis of a wide range of
economic and financial indicators.
Third, the Eurosystem puts significant emphasis on the need to
carefully explain its policy actions in terms of its monetary policy
strategy. Therefore, the Eurosystem has established various channels for
the communication with market participants and the general public. The most
important communication channels are the ECB's Monthly Bulletin, its press
releases and the press conferences following the meetings of the Governing
Council, the President's appearances in the European Parliament and the
speeches given by the members of the Governing Council.
Fourth, the Eurosystem's monetary policy is implemented in a marketed-
oriented manner. The Eurosystem's key policy instrument is its weekly
tender for two-week repo operations, the so-called main refinancing
operations. The features of the monetary policy operations are decided by
the decision-making bodies of the ECB, but the operations are conducted in
a decentralised manner by the NCBs.
The experience gained from the first five months of operations has
shown that the Eurosystem's procedures for decision-making and operational
implementation works very well. There are therefore no operational reasons
to call into question the ability of the Eurosystem to fulfil its mandate
to ensure price stability in the euro area. However, stable macroeconomic
policies cannot be achieved by monetary policy alone. It is also necessary
for governments to pursue fiscal and structural policies consistent with
such macroeconomic stability.
In order to ensure fiscal discipline in the participating countries,
the EU Council agreed in June 1997 to establish the so-called Stability and
Growth Pact. This Pact sets an upper limit of 3% of GDP for the fiscal
deficits of the countries participating in the euro area. Furthermore, the
Pact specifies as an objective that Member States are to bring government
budgets close to balance or even into surplus in the medium term. Only if
this objective is met will sufficient room for manoeuvre be created to
enable fiscal policy to react to cyclical developments without risking a
loss of credibility.
As regards structural policies, the policy framework is, so far, less
well developed. This is worrying given that the need for structural reform
is urgent in many areas in order to be able to effectively promote greater
growth potential and higher employment. I appreciate that these problems
are generally acknowledged, and some action has been taken in recent years.
For example, it is encouraging that the European Employment Pact adopted at
the EU Summit in Cologne last weekend explicitly recognises the need to
pursue comprehensive structural labour market reform.
Nevertheless, experience from several countries shows that it usually
takes a long time for the full effects of structural reforms to be seen.
Therefore, it is worrisome that structural reforms, in particular as
regards labour markets as well as those to limit expenditure on social
security and pension systems, are long overdue in several Member States.
Clearly, the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union does not
mean that the efforts undertaken during the convergence process can be
relaxed. On the contrary, the need for policy co-ordination among the
participating countries is now even more pressing. We have already seen
examples of negative market reactions to any perceived slippage in fiscal
discipline or postponement of structural reform. Personally, I think that
these swift market reactions, although sometimes exaggerated, may be
helpful in promoting a continued stability-oriented policy thinking in
Europe. Any move towards less responsible policies would come up against
intense peer pressure from other countries.
In this context, I would once more like to underline how important it
is that a consensus has emerged among European policy-makers on the virtues
of price stability, fiscal discipline and market-oriented structural
reform. In this way, we have already pushed the boundary significantly
towards a macroeconomic environment conducive to growth and employment,
although much still needs to be done in the years to come.
4. Pushing the boundaries in the development of financial markets
However, the success of the euro is not only in the hands of central
bankers and policy-makers. An important area in which the private sector
has an instrumental role in meeting the challenge of pushing the boundaries
is in the development of the European financial markets. In order for the
euro to be a success, it is important for the euro area financial markets
to become wider, deeper and more diversified. The introduction of the euro
has provided further input into this process; the elimination of exchange
rate risks has removed one of the main barriers to financial market
integration in Europe.
In most European countries, the financial markets have,
traditionally, been rather shallow, with few participants and a narrow
range of financial instruments on offer. A high degree of segmentation and
a lack of cross-border competition have implied relatively low trading
volumes, high transaction costs and a reluctance to implement innovative
financial instruments. This segmentation has been a function of exchange
rate borders, tradition, differing practices and, of course, national
regulations and tax regimes.
Following the elimination of the barriers implied by different
currencies, it is now up to the European Commission and the relevant
national authorities to further the integration process in the areas of
regulation and taxation. Meanwhile, it is up to market participants to take
advantage of the business opportunities implied by the increased scope for
market integration.
The introduction of the euro brought about an almost immediate
integration of the national money markets into a euro area-wide money
market. This was made possible thanks to the establishment of pan-European
payment systems, such as the TARGET system set up by the Eurosystem, which
enables banks to access liquidity throughout the euro area in real time.
The cross-border integration of bond markets in the euro area is
progressing at a slower pace, as is also true of equities and derivatives
markets. This notwithstanding, we are also experiencing important
developments in these segments of the financial markets. These developments
are partly due to the general trends towards globalisation and
technological refinement and partly related to the introduction of the
euro. As a result of the introduction of the euro, market participants
increasingly perceive similar instruments traded in the different national
markets to be close substitutes. This holds true, in particular, for bonds
issued by the euro area governments, where the establishment of common
benchmarks, the narrowing of yield spreads and increased market liquidity
seem to indicate that a high degree of cross-border substitutability has
already been achieved.
The fact that euro area financial instruments are increasingly
considered to be close substitutes increases the competitive pressures on
national markets to attract issuers and investors wishing to benefit from
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